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Distributed Hypothesis Testing with Privacy
Constraints
Atefeh Gilani Selma Belhadj Amor Sadaf Salehkalaibar Vincent Y. F. Tan
Abstract—We revisit the distributed hypothesis testing (or
hypothesis testing with communication constraints) problem from
the viewpoint of privacy. Instead of observing the raw data di-
rectly, the transmitter observes a sanitized or randomized version
of it. We impose an upper bound on the mutual information
between the raw and randomized data. Under this scenario,
the receiver, which is also provided with side information, is
required to make a decision on whether the null or alternative
hypothesis is in effect. We first provide a general lower bound on
the type-II exponent for an arbitrary pair of hypotheses. Next,
we show that if the distribution under the alternative hypothesis
is the product of the marginals of the distribution under the null
(i.e., testing against independence), then the exponent is known
exactly. Moreover, we show that the strong converse property
holds. Using ideas from Euclidean information theory, we also
provide an approximate expression for the exponent when the
communication rate is low and the privacy level is high. Finally,
we illustrate our results with a binary and a Gaussian example.
Index Terms—Hypothesis testing, Privacy, Mutual information,
Testing against independence, Zero-rate communication
I. INTRODUCTION
In the distributed hypothesis testing (or hypothesis testing
with communication constraints) problem, some observations
from the environment are collected by the sensors in a
network. They describe these observations over the network
which are finally received by the decision center. The goal
is to guess the joint distribution governing the observations
at terminals. In particular, there are two possible hypotheses
H = 0 or H = 1, where the joint distribution of the
observations is specified under each of them. The performance
of this system is characterized by two criteria: the type-I and
the type-II error probabilities. The probability of deciding
on H = 1 (resp. H = 0) when the original hypothesis is
H = 0 (resp. H = 1) is referred to as the type-I error
(type-II error) probability. It is desired that the type-II error
probability exponentially goes to zero as the blocklength n
grows to infinity, under a constrained type-I error probability.
A special case of interest is testing against independence
where the joint distribution under H = 1 is the product of the
marginals under H = 0. The optimal exponent of type-II error
probability for testing against independence is determined
by Ahlswede and Csisza´r in [1]. Several extensions of this
basic problem are studied for a multi-observer setup [2]–[6],
a multi-decision center setup [7], [8] and a setup with security
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Fig. 1. Hypothesis testing with communication and privacy constraints
constraints [9]. The main idea of the achievable scheme in
these works is typicality testing [10], [11]. The sensor finds
a jointly typical codeword with its observation and sends
the corresponding bin index to the decision center. The final
decision is declared based on typicality check of the received
codeword with the observation at the center.
A. Injecting Privacy Considerations Into our System
We revisit the distributed hypothesis testing problem from
a privacy perspective. In many applications such as health-
care systems, there is a need to randomize the data before
publishing it. We use a privacy mechanism to sanitize the
observation at the terminal before it is compressed; see Fig. 1.
The compression is performed at a separate terminal called
transmitter, which communicates the randomized data over
a noiseless link of rate R to a receiver. The hypothesis
testing is performed using the received data (the compression
index and additional side information) to determine the correct
hypothesis governing the original observations. The privacy
criterion is defined by the mutual information [12]–[15] of
the published and original data.
There is a long history of research to provide appropri-
ate metrics to measure privacy. To quantify the information
leakage an observation Xˆ can induce on a latent variable
X , Shannon’s mutual information I(X ; Xˆ) is considered in
[12]–[15]. Smith [13] proposed to use Arimoto’s mutual in-
formation of order∞, I∞(X ; Xˆ). Barthe and Ko¨pf [16]–[18]
proposed the maximal information leakagemaxPX I∞(X ; Xˆ).
We refer the reader to [19] for a survey on the existing
information leakage measures. A different line of works, in
statistics, computer science, and other related fields, concerns
differential privacy, initially proposed in [20]. Furthermore, a
generalized notion—(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [21]—provides
a unified mathematical framework for data privacy. The reader
is referred to the survey by Dwork [22] and the statistical
framework studied by Wasserman and Zhou [23] and the
references therein.
The privacy mechanism can be either memoryless or non-
memoryless. In the former, the distribution of the randomized
data at each time instant depends on the original sequence at
the same time and not on the previous history of the data.
2B. Description of our System Model
We propose a coding scheme for the proposed setup. The
idea is that the sensor, upon observing the source sequence,
performs a typicality test and obtains its belief of the hypoth-
esis. If the belief is H = 0, it publishes the randomized data
based on a specific memoryless mechanism. However, if its
belief is H = 1, it sends an all-zero sequence to let the trans-
mitter know about its decision. The transmitter communicates
the received data, which is a sanitized version of the original
data or an all-zero sequence, over the noiseless link to the
receiver. In this scheme, the whole privacy mechanism is non-
memoryless since the typicality check of the source sequence
which uses the history of the observation, determines the
published data. It is shown that the achievable error exponent
recovers previous results on hypothesis testing with zero and
positive communication rates in [10].
A difference of the proposed scheme with some previous
works is highlighted as follows. The privacy mechanism even
if it is memoryless, cannot be viewed as a noiseless link
of a rate equivalent to the privacy criterion. Particularly, the
proposed model is different from cascade hypothesis testing
problem of [8] or similar works [3], [4] which consider con-
secutive noiseless links for data compression and distributed
hypothesis testing. The difference comes from the fact that
in these works, a codeword is chosen jointly typical with the
observed sequence at the terminal and its corresponding index
is sent over the noiseless link. However, in our model, the
randomized sequence is not necessarily jointly typical with
the original sequence. Thus, there is a need for an achievable
scheme which lets the transmitter know whether the original
data is typical or not.
The problem of hypothesis testing against independence
with a memoryless privacy mechanism is also considered.
A coding scheme is proposed where the sensor outputs the
randomized data based on the memoryless privacy mecha-
nism. The optimality of the achievable type-II error exponent
is shown by providing a strong converse. Specializing the
optimal error exponent to a binary example shows that an
increase in the privacy criterion (a less stringent privacy
mechanism) results in a larger type-II error exponent. Thus,
there exists a trade-off between privacy and hypothesis testing
criteria. The optimal type-II error exponent is further studied
for the case of restricted privacy mechanism and zero-rate
communication. The Euclidean approach of [24], [25] is used
to approximate the error exponent for this regime. The result
confirms the trade-off between the privacy criterion and type-
II error exponent. Finally, a Gaussian setup is proposed and
its optimal error exponent is established.
C. Main Contributions
The contributions of the paper are listed in the following:
• An achievable type-II error exponent is proposed using
a non-memoryless privacy mechanism (Theorem 1 in
Section III);
• The optimal error exponent of testing against indepen-
dence with a memoryless privacy mechanism is deter-
mined. In addition, a strong converse is also proved
(Theorem 2 in Section IV-A);
• A binary example is proposed to show the trade-off
between the privacy and error exponent (Section IV-C);
• A Euclidean approximation [24] of the error exponent is
provided (Section IV-D);
• A Gaussian setup is proposed and its optimal error
exponent is derived (Proposition 2 in Section IV-E).
D. Notation
The notation mostly follows [26]. Random variables are
denoted by capital letters, e.g., X , Y , and their realizations by
lower case lettes, e.g., x, y. The alphabet of the random vari-
able X is denoted as X . Sequences of random variables and
their realizations are denoted by (Xi, . . . , Xj) and (xi, . . . , xj)
and are abbreviated as Xji and x
j
i . We use the alternative
notation Xj when i = 1. Vectors and matrices are denoted
by boldface letters, e.g., k, W. The ℓ2-norm of k is denoted
as ‖k‖. The notation kT denotes the transpose of k.
The probability mass function (pmf) of a discrete random
variable X is denoted as PX , the conditional pmf of X given
Y is denoted as PX|Y . The notation D(PX‖QX) denotes the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between two pmfs PX and
QX . The total variation distance between two pmfs PX and
QX is denoted by
∣∣PX −QX∣∣ = 12 ∑x |PX(x)−QX(x)|. We
use tp(xn, yn) to denote the joint type of (xn, yn).
For a given PXY and a positive number µ, we denote by
T nµ (PXY ), the set of jointly µ-typical sequences [26], i.e, the
set of all (xn, yn) whose joint type is within µ of PXY . The
notation T n(PX) denotes for the type class of the type PX .
The notation hb(·) denotes the binary entropy function,
h−1b (·) its inverse over
[
0, 12
]
, and a ⋆ b , a(1− b)+ (1− a)b
for 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. The differential entropy of a continuous
random variable X is h(X). All logarithms log(·) are taken
with respect to base 2.
E. Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes a mathematical setup for our proposed
problem. Section III discusses hypothesis testing with general
distributions. The results for hypothesis testing against inde-
pendence with a memoryless privacy mechanism are provided
in Section IV. The paper is concluded in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let X , Y , and Xˆ be arbitrary finite alphabets and let n
be a positive integer. Consider the hypothesis testing prob-
lem with communication and privacy constraints depicted in
Fig. 1. The first terminal in the system, the Observer, receives
the sequence Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ Xn and outputs the
sequence Xˆn = (Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn) ∈ Xˆn, which is a noisy
version of Xn under a privacy mechanism determined by
the conditional probability distribution PXˆn|Xn ; the second
terminal, the Transmitter, receives the sequence Xˆn; the third
terminal, the Receiver, observes the side-information sequence
Y n = (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ Yn. Under the null hypothesis
H = 0: (Xn, Y n) ∼ i.i.d. PXY , (1)
3whereas under the alternative hypothesis
H = 1: (Xn, Y n) ∼ i.i.d. QXY , (2)
for two given pmfs PXY and QXY .
The privacy mechanism is described by the conditional pmf
PXˆn|Xn which maps each sequence X
n ∈ Xn to a sequence
Xˆn ∈ Xˆn. For any (xˆn, xn, yn) ∈ Xˆn × Xn × Yn, the joint
distributions considering the privacy mechanism are given by
Pn
XˆXY
(xˆn, xn, yn),PXˆn|Xn(xˆ
n|xn) ·
n∏
i=1
PXY (xi, yi), (3)
Qn
XˆXY
(xˆn, xn, yn),PXˆn|Xn(xˆ
n|xn) ·
n∏
i=1
QXY (xi, yi). (4)
A memoryless/local privacy mechanism is defined by a
conditional pmf PXˆ|X which stochastically and independently
maps each entry Xi ∈ X of Xn to a released Xˆi ∈ Xˆ
to construct Xˆn. Consequently, for the memoryless privacy
mechanism, the conditional pmf PXˆn|Xn(xˆ
n|xn) factorizes as
follows:
PXˆn|Xn(xˆ
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
PXˆ|X(xˆi|xi) = PnXˆ|X(xˆn|xn),
∀(xˆn, xn) ∈ Xˆn ×Xn. (5)
There is a noise-free bit pipe of rate R from the transmitter
to the receiver. Upon observing Xˆn, the transmitter computes
the message M = φ(n)(Xˆn) using a possibly stochastic
encoding function φ(n) : Xˆn → {0, . . . , ⌊2nR⌋} and sends
it over the bit pipe to the receiver.
The goal of the receiver is to produce a guess of H using a
decoding function g(n) : Yn × {0, ..., ⌊2nR⌋} → {0, 1} based
on the observation Y n and the received message M . Thus the
estimate of the hypothesis is Hˆ = g(n)(Y n,M).
This induces a partition of the sample space Xˆn×Xn×Yn
into an acceptance region An defined as follows:
An ,
{
(xˆn, xn, yn) : g(n)(yn, φ(n)(xˆn)) = 0
}
, (6)
and a rejection region denoted by Acn.
Definition 1: For any ǫ ∈ [0, 1) and for a given rate-
privacy pair (R,L) ∈ R2+, we say that a type-II exponent
θ ∈ R+ is (ǫ, R, L)-achievable if there exists a sequence
of functions and conditional pmfs (φ(n), g(n), PXˆn|Xn), such
that the corresponding sequences of type-I and type-II error
probabilities at the receiver are respectively defined as
αn , P
n
XˆXY
(Acn) and βn , QnXˆXY (An), (7)
and they satisfy
lim sup
n→∞
αn ≤ ǫ and lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
βn
≥ θ. (8)
Furthermore, the privacy measure
Tn ,
1
n
I(Xn; Xˆn), (9)
satisfies
lim sup
n→∞
Tn ≤ L. (10)
The optimal exponent θ∗ǫ (R,L) is the supremum of all
(ǫ, R, L)-achievable θ ∈ R+.
III. GENERAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING
A. Achievable Error Exponent
The following presents an achievable error exponent for the
proposed setup.
Theorem 1: For a given ǫ ∈ [0, 1) and a rate-privacy pair
(R,L) ∈ R2+, the optimal type-II error exponent θ∗ǫ (R,L) for
the multiterminal hypothesis testing setup under the privacy
constraint L and the rate constraint R satisfies
θ∗ǫ (R,L) ≥ max
PU|Xˆ ,PXˆ|X :
R≥I(U ;Xˆ)
L≥I(X;Xˆ)
min
P˜UXˆXY ∈
PUXˆXY
D(P˜UXˆXY ‖PU|XˆPXˆ|XQXY),
(11)
where the set PUXˆXY is defined as
PUXˆXY
∆
=

P˜UXˆXY
∣∣∣∣∣∣
P˜X = PX ,
P˜UY = PUY ,
P˜UXˆ = PUXˆ

 . (12)
Given PU|Xˆ and PXˆ|X , the mutual informations in (11) are
calculated according to the following joint distribution:
PUXˆXY , PU|Xˆ · PXˆ|X · PXY . (13)
Proof: The coding scheme is given in the following
section. For the analysis, see Appendix A.
B. Coding Scheme
In this section, we propose a coding scheme for Theorem 1,
under fixed rate and privacy constraints (R,L) ∈ R2+. Fix
the joint distribution PUXˆXY as in (13). Let PU (u) be the
marginal distribution of U ∈ U defined as
PU (u) ,
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
PU|Xˆ(u|xˆ)
∑
x∈X
PXˆX(xˆ, x). (14)
Fix positive µ > 0 and ζ > 0, an arbitrary blocklength n and
two conditional pmfs PXˆ|X and PU|Xˆ over finite auxiliary
alphabets Xˆ and U . Fix also the rate and privacy leakage level
as
R = I(U ; Xˆ) + µ, and L = I(Xˆ ;X) + ζ. (15)
Codebook Generation: Randomly and independently gener-
ate a codebook
CU ,
{
Un(m) : m ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊2nR⌋}} , (16)
by drawing Un(m) in an i.i.d. manner according to PU . The
codebook is shown to all terminals.
Observer: Upon observing xn, it checks whether
xn ∈ T nµ/4(PX). If successful, it outputs the sequence
xˆn where its i-th component xˆi is generated based on xi,
according to PXˆ|X(xˆi|xi). If the typicality check is not
successful, the observer then outputs 0n which is an all-zero
sequence of length n, where xˆn = 0n.
Transmitter: Upon observing xˆn, if xˆn 6= 0n, the transmitter
finds an index m such that
(
un(m), xˆn
) ∈ T nµ/2(PUXˆ). If
successful, it sends the index m over the noiseless link to the
receiver. Otherwise, if the typicality check is not successful or
xˆn = 0n, it sends m = 0.
4Receiver: Upon observing yn and receiving the index m,
if m = 0, the receiver declares Hˆ = 1. If m 6= 0, it checks
whether
(
un(m), yn
) ∈ T nµ (PUY ). If the test is successful,
the receiver declares Hˆ = 0; otherwise, it sets Hˆ = 1.
Remark 1: In the above scheme, the sequence Xˆn is chosen
to be an n-length zero-sequence when the observer finds
that Xn is not typical according to PX . Thus, the privacy
mechanism is not memoryless and the sequence Xˆn is not
i.i.d. A detailed analysis in Appendix A shows that the privacy
criterion is not larger than L as the blocklength n→∞.
C. Discussion
In the following, we discuss some special cases. First,
suppose that R = 0. As it is shown in the following corollary,
Theorem 1 recovers Han’s result [1] for distributed hypothesis
testing with zero-rate communication.
Corollary 1 (Theorem 5 in [10]): Suppose that QXY > 0.
For all ǫ ∈ [0, 1), the optimal error exponent of the zero-rate
communication for any privacy mechanism (including non-
memoryless mechanisms) is given by the following:
θ∗ǫ (0, L) = min
P˜XY :
P˜X=PX
P˜Y =PY
D(P˜XY ‖QXY). (17)
Proof: The proof of achievability follows by Theorem 1,
in which Xˆ is arbitrary and the auxiliary U = ∅ due to the
zero-rate constraint. The proof of the strong converse follows
along the same lines as [27].
Remark 2: Consider the case of R > 0 and L = 0 where
Xˆ is independent of X . Using Theorem 1, the optimal error
exponent is lower bounded as follows:
θ∗ǫ (R, 0) ≥ min
P˜XY :
P˜X=PX
P˜Y =PY
D(P˜XY ‖QXY). (18)
However, the above error exponent is not necessarily optimal
since the communication-rate is positive. Comparing this spe-
cial case with the one in Corollary 1 shows that the proposed
model does not, in general, admit symmetry between the rate
and privacy constraints. However, we will see from some
specific examples in the following that the roles of R and
L are symmetric.
Now, suppose that L is so large such that L > H(X).
The following corollary shows that Theorem 1 recovers Han’s
result in [10] for distributed hypothesis testing over a rate-R
communication link.
Corollary 2 (Theorem 2 in [10]): Assuming L > H(X),
the optimal error exponent is lower bounded as the following:
θ∗ǫ (R,L) ≥ max
PU|X :
R≥I(U ;X)
min
P˜UXY :
P˜UX=PUX
P˜UY =PUY
D(P˜UXY ‖PU|XQXY ).
(19)
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 1 by specializing
to Xˆ = X .
The above two special cases reveal a trade-off between the
privacy criterion and the achievable error exponent when the
communication rate is positive, i.e., R > 0. An increase in L
results in a larger achievable error exponent. This observation
is further illustrated by an example in Section IV-C to follow.
IV. HYPOTHESIS TESTING AGAINST INDEPENDENCE WITH
A MEMORYLESS PRIVACY MECHANISM
In this section, we consider testing against independence
where the joint pmf under H = 1 factorizes as follows:
QXY = PX · PY . (20)
The privacy mechanism is assumed to be memoryless here.
A. Optimal Error Exponent
The following theorem, which includes a strong converse,
states the optimal error exponent for this special case.
Theorem 2: For any (R,L) ∈ R2+, define
θ∗ǫ (R,L) = max
PU|Xˆ ,PXˆ|X :
R≥I(U ;Xˆ)
L≥I(X;Xˆ)
I(U ;Y ). (21)
Then, for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1) and any (R,L) ∈ R2+, the optimal
error exponent for testing against independence when using
a memoryless privacy mechanism is given by (21), where it
suffices to choose |U| ≤ |Xˆ |+ 1 and |Xˆ | ≤ |X | according to
Caratheodory’s theorem [28, Theorem 15.3.5].
Proof: The coding scheme is given in the following
section. For the rest of proof, see Appendix B.
B. Coding Scheme
In this section, we propose a coding scheme for Theorem 2.
Fix the joint distribution as in (13), and the rate and privacy
constraints as in (15). Generate the codebook CU as in (16).
Observer: Upon observing xn, it outputs the sequence xˆn
in which the i-th component xˆi is generated based on xi,
according to PXˆ|X(xˆi|xi).
Transmitter: It finds an index m such that(
un(m), xˆn
) ∈ T nµ/2(PUXˆ). If successful, it sends the
index m over the noiseless link to the receiver. Otherwise, it
sends m = 0.
Receiver: Upon observing yn and receiving the index m,
if m = 0, the receiver declares Hˆ = 1. If m 6= 0, it checks
whether
(
un(m), yn
) ∈ T nµ (PUY ). If the test is successful,
the receiver declares Hˆ = 0; otherwise, it sets Hˆ = 1.
Remark 3: In the above scheme, the sequence Xˆn is
i.i.d. since it is generated based on the memoryless mecha-
nism PXˆ|X .
When the communication rate is positive, there exists a
trade-off between the optimal error exponent and the privacy
criterion. The following example elucidates this trade-off.
C. Binary Example
In this section, we study hypothesis testing against in-
dependence for a binary example. Suppose that under both
hypotheses, we haveX ∼ Bern(12 ). Under the null hypothesis,
H = 0: Y = X ⊕N, N ∼ Bern(q) (22)
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for some 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, where N is independent of X . Under
the alternative hypothesis
H = 1: Y ∼ Bern
(1
2
)
, (23)
where Y is independent ofX . The cardinality constraint shows
that it suffices to choose |Xˆ | = 2. Due to symmetry of
the source X on its alphabet, without loss of optimality, we
can choose PXˆ|X to be a binary symmetric channel (BSC).
The argument follows since the error exponent depends on
X through the conditional pmf PU|Xˆ thanks to the Markov
chain U⊸−Xˆ⊸−X . The random variable Xˆ is determined
by PXˆ|X through the privacy constraint L ≥ I(X ; Xˆ).
This constraint remains unchanged by choosing PXˆ|X(1|0) =
PXˆ|X(0|1) and PXˆ|X(0|0) = PXˆ|X(1|1) due to symmetry of
the source X .
The cardinality bound on the auxiliary random variable U
is |U| ≤ 3. The following proposition states that it is also
optimal to choose PU|Xˆ to be a BSC.
Proposition 1: The optimal error exponent of the proposed
binary setup is given by the following:
θ∗ǫ (R,L) = 1− hb
(
q ⋆ h−1b (1− L) ⋆ h−1b (1−R)
)
. (24)
Proof: For the proof of achievability, choose the following
auxiliary random variables:
Xˆ = X ⊕ Zˆ, Zˆ ∼ Bern(p1) (25)
U = Xˆ ⊕ Z, Z ∼ Bern(p2), (26)
for some 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1 where Zˆ and Z are independent of
X and (X, Xˆ), respectively. The optimal error exponent of
Theorem 2 reduces to the following:
θ∗ǫ (R,L) = max
0≤p1,p2≤1:
R≥1−hb(p2)
L≥1−hb(p1)
1− hb(q ⋆ p1 ⋆ p2), (27)
which can be simplified to (24). For the proof of the converse,
see Appendix C.
Fig. 2 illustrates the error exponent versus the privacy
parameter L for a fixed rate R. There is clearly a trade-
off between θ∗ǫ (R,L) and L. For a less stringent privacy
requirement (large L), the error exponent θ∗ǫ (R,L) increases.
D. Euclidean Approximation
In this section, we propose Euclidean approximations [24],
[25] for the optimal error exponent of testing against indepen-
dence scenario (Theorem 2) when R ≈ 0 and L ≈ 0. Consider
the optimal error exponent as follows:
θ∗ǫ (R,L) = max
PU|Xˆ ,PXˆ|X :
R≥I(U ;Xˆ)
L≥I(X;Xˆ)
I(U ;Y ). (28)
Let W, of dimension |Y| × |X |, denote the transition matrix
PY |X , which is itself induced by PX and the joint distribution
PXY . Now, consider the rate constraint as follows:
I(U ; Xˆ) =
∑
u∈U
PU (u)D
(
PXˆ|U (·|u)‖PXˆ
) ≤ R. (29)
Assuming R ≈ 0, we let PXˆ|U (·|u) be a local perturbation
from PXˆ(·), where we have
PXˆ|U (·|u) = PXˆ(·) + ψu(·), (30)
for a perturbation ψu(·) satisfying∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
ψu(xˆ) = 0, (31)
in order to preserve the row stochasticity of PXˆ|U . Using a
χ2-approximation [24], we can write:
D
(
PXˆ|U (·|u)‖PXˆ
) ≈ 1
2
· log e · ‖ku‖2 , (32)
where ku denotes the length-|Xˆ | column vector of weighted
perturbations whose xˆ-th component is defined as:
ku(xˆ) ,
1√
PXˆ(xˆ)
· ψu(xˆ), ∀xˆ ∈ Xˆ . (33)
Using the above definition, the rate constraint in (29) can be
written as: ∑
u∈U
PU (u) ‖ku‖2 ≤ 2R
log e
. (34)
Similarly, consider the privacy constraint as the following:
I(X ; Xˆ) =
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
PXˆ(xˆ)D
(
PX|Xˆ(·|xˆ)‖PX
) ≤ L. (35)
Assuming L ≈ 0, we let PX|Xˆ(·|xˆ) be a local perturbation
from PX(·) where
PX|Xˆ(·|xˆ) = PX(·) + φxˆ(·), (36)
for a perturbation φxˆ(·) that satifies:∑
x∈X
φxˆ(x) = 0. (37)
Again, using a χ2-approximation, we obtain the following:
D
(
PX|Xˆ(·|xˆ)‖PX
) ≈ 1
2
log e ‖kxˆ‖2 , (38)
where kxˆ is a length-|X | column vector and its x-th compo-
nent is defined as follows:
kxˆ(x) ,
1√
PX(x)
· φxˆ(x), ∀x ∈ X . (39)
6Thus, the privacy constraint in (35) can be written as:∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
PXˆ(xˆ) ‖kxˆ‖2 ≤
2L
log e
. (40)
For any x ∈ X and u ∈ U , we define the following:
Λu(x) ,
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
ψu(xˆ) φxˆ(x) (41)
=
√
PX(x)
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
√
PXˆ(xˆ) ku(xˆ) kxˆ(x), (42)
and the corresponding length-|X | column vector Λu defined
as follows:
Λu =
[√
PX
]
KXˆ
[√
PXˆ
]
ku, (43)
where
[√
PX
]
denotes a diagonal |X |×|X |-matrix, so that its
(x, x)-th element (x ∈ X ) is√PX(x), and [√PXˆ] is defined
similarly. Moreover,KXˆ refers to the |X |×|Xˆ |-matrix defined
as follows:
KXˆ ,
[
k1 k2 . . . kxˆ . . . k|Xˆ |
]
. (44)
Let
[√
PY
]−1
be the inverse of diagonal |Y| × |Y|-matrix[√
PY
]
. As shown in Appendix D, the optimization problem
in (28) can be written as follows:
max
{ku}u∈U ,KXˆ
1
2
log e
[∑
u∈U
PU (u)·
∥∥∥∥[√PY ]−1W [√PX]KXˆ [√PXˆ]ku
∥∥∥∥
2
]
(45)
subject to:
∑
u∈U
PU (u) ‖ku‖2 ≤ 2R
log e
, (46)
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
PXˆ(xˆ) ‖kxˆ‖2 ≤
2L
log e
. (47)
The following example specializes the above approximation
to the binary case.
Example 1: Consider the binary setup of Example IV-C and
the choice of auxiliary random variables in (26). Since the
privacy mechanism is assumed to be a BSC, we have
PX =
[
1
2
1
2
]T
, PXˆ =
[
1
2
1
2
]T
, (48)
Now, we consider the vectors ku=0 and ku=1 defined as
ku=0 =
[√
2ξ1 −
√
2ξ1
]T
, (49)
ku=1 =
[−√2ξ1 √2ξ1]T . (50)
for some positive ξ1. This yields the following:
PXˆ|U=0 = PXˆ + [ξ1 − ξ1]T , (51)
PXˆ|U=1 = PXˆ + [−ξ1 ξ1]T (52)
We also choose the vectors kxˆ=0 and kxˆ=1 as follows:
kxˆ=0 =
[√
2ξ2 −
√
2ξ2·
]T
, (53)
kxˆ=1 =
[−√2ξ2 √2ξ2]T , (54)
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Fig. 3. θ∗
ǫ
(R ≈ 0, L ≈ 0) versus L for q = 0.1 and R = L.
which results in
PX|Xˆ=0 = PX + [ξ2 − ξ2]T , (55)
PX|Xˆ=1 = PX + [−ξ2 ξ2]T . (56)
Notice that the matrixW is given by
W =
[
1− q q
q 1− q
]
. (57)
Thus, the optimization problem in (45) and (47) reduces to
the following:
max
ξ1,ξ2
8 log e (1− 2q)2 |ξ1|2 |ξ2|2 (58)
subject to: 4 |ξ1|2 ≤ 2R
log e
and 4 |ξ2|2 ≤ 2L
log e
. (59)
Solving the above optimization yields
θ∗ǫ (R ≈ 0, L ≈ 0) ≈
2
log e
(1 − 2q)2 R L. (60)
For some values of parameters, the approximation in (60) is
compared to the error exponent of (24) in Fig. 3. We observe
that when R = L ≈ 0, the approximation turns out to be
excellent.
Remark 4: The trade-off between the optimal error exponent
and the privacy can again be verified from (60) in the case of
L ≈ 0 and R ≈ 0. As L becomes larger (which corresponds to
a less stringent privacy requirement), the error exponent also
increases. For a fixed error exponent, a trade-off between R
and L exists. An increase in R results in a decrease of L.
E. Gaussian Setup
In this section, we consider hypothesis testing against inde-
pendence over a Gaussian example. Suppose thatX ∼ N (0, 1)
and under the null hypothesisH = 0, the sources X and Y are
jointly Gaussian random variables distributed as N (0,GXY ),
where GXY is defined as the following:
GXY
∆
=
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]
, (61)
for some 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
Under the alternative hypothesis H = 1, we assume that
X and Y are independent Gaussian random variables, each
distributed as N (0, 1). Consider the privacy constraint as
follows:
L ≥ I(X ; Xˆ) = h(X)− h(X |Xˆ). (62)
7For a Gaussian source X , the conditional entropy h(X |Xˆ)
is maximized for a jointly Gaussian (X, Xˆ). This choice
minimizes the RHS of (62). Thus, without loss of optimality,
we choose
X = Xˆ + Z, Z ∼ N (0, 2−2L) , (63)
where Z is independent of Xˆ . The following proposition states
that it is optimal to choose U jointly Gaussian with (X, Xˆ, Y ).
Proposition 2: The optimal error exponent of the proposed
Gaussian setup is given by
θ∗ǫ (R,L)=
1
2
log
(
1
1− ρ2 · (1 − 2−2R) · (1− 2−2L)
)
. (64)
Proof: For the proof of achievability, we choose Xˆ as
in (63). Also, let
Xˆ = U + Zˆ, Zˆ ∼ N (0, β2), (65)
for some β2 ≥ 0, where Zˆ is independent of U . For the
details of the simplification and also the proof of converse,
see Appendix E.
Remark 5: If L = ∞, the above proposition recovers the
optimal error exponent of Rahman and Wagner [5, Corollary 7]
for testing against independence of Gaussian sources over a
noiseless link of rate R.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, distributed hypothesis testing with privacy
constraints is considered. A coding scheme is proposed where
the sensor decides on one of hypotheses and generates the ran-
domized data based on its decision. The transmitter describes
the randomized data over a noiseless link to the receiver. The
privacy mechanism in this scheme is non-memoryless. The
special case of testing against independence with a memory-
less privacy mechanism is studied in detail. The optimal type-
II error exponent of this case is established, together with
a strong converse. A binary example is proposed where the
trade-off between the privacy criterion and the error exponent
is reported. Euclidean approximations are provided for the case
in which the privacy level is high and and the communication
rate is vanishingly small. The optimal type-II error exponent
of a Gaussian setup is also established.
A future line of research is to study the second-order
asymptotics of the proposed model. The second-order analysis
of a distributed hypothesis testing without privacy constraints
and with zero-rate communication was studied in [29]. In all
our proposed extensions, the trade-off between the privacy
and type-II error exponent is confirmed as an increase in the
privacy criterion (a less stringent privacy requirement) yields a
larger error exponent. The next step is to see whether the trade-
off between privacy and error exponent affects the second-
order term.
Another potential line for future research is to consider
other metrics of privacy instead of the mutual information.
A possible candidate is to use the maximal leakage [16]–[18]
and to analyze the performance in tandem with distributed
hypothesis testing problem.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The analysis is based on the scheme of Section III-B.
Error Probability Analysis: We analyze type-I and type-II
error probabilities averaged over all random codebooks. By
standard arguments as in [28, pp. 204], it can be shown that
there exists at least a codebook that satisfies the constraints
on error probabilities.
For the considered µ > 0 and the considered blocklength n,
let Pnµ be the set of all joint types πUXˆXY over Un × Xˆn ×
Xn × Yn which satisfy the following constraints:∣∣πX − PX ∣∣ ≤ µ/4, (66)∣∣πUXˆ − PUXˆ ∣∣ ≤ µ/2, (67)∣∣πUY − PUY ∣∣ ≤ µ. (68)
First, we analyze the type-I error probability. For the case of
M 6= 0, we define the following event:
E , {(Un(M), Y n) /∈ T nµ (PUY )} . (69)
Thus, type-I error probability can be upper bounded as follows:
αn ≤ Pr
[
Xˆn = 0n orM = 0 or E∣∣H = 0] (70)
≤ Pr
[
Xˆn = 0n
∣∣H = 0]
+ Pr
[
M = 0
∣∣Xˆn 6= 0n,H = 0]
+ Pr
[
E∣∣M 6= 0, Xˆn 6= 0n,H = 0] (71)
≤ ǫ/3 + Pr
[
M = 0
∣∣Xˆn 6= 0n,H = 0]
+ Pr
[
E∣∣M 6= 0, Xˆn 6= 0n,H = 0] (72)
≤ ǫ/3 + ǫ/3 + Pr
[
E∣∣M 6= 0, Xˆn 6= 0n,H = 0] (73)
≤ ǫ/3 + ǫ/3 + ǫ/3 = ǫ, (74)
where (72) follows from AEP [28, Theorem 3.1.1]; (73)
follows from the covering lemma [26, Lemma 3.3] and the
rate constraint (15), (74) follows from Markov lemma [26,
Lemma 12.1]. In all justifications, n is taken to be sufficiently
large.
Next, we analyze the type-II error probability. The accep-
tance region at the receiver is
ARxn =
⋃
m
{
(xˆn, xn, yn) :
xˆn 6= 0n, (un(m), xˆn, xn, yn) ∈ T nµ (PUXˆXY )
}
. (75)
The set ARxn is contained within the following acceptance
region A¯n:
A¯n =
⋃
m
{
(xˆn, xn, yn) :
xˆn 6= 0n, (un(m), xˆn, xn, yn) ∈
⋃
π∈Pnµ
T n(π)
}
. (76)
8Let Fm , {
(
Un(m), Xˆn, Xn, Y n
) ∈ Pnµ}. Therefore, the
average of type-II error probability over all codebooks is upper
bounded as follows:
EC [βn] ≤ QnXˆXY
(A¯n) (77)
≤
∑
m
Pr
[
Xˆn 6=0n,Fm
∣∣H = 1] (78)
≤
∑
m
Pr
[
Fm
∣∣ Xˆn 6= 0n,H = 1] (79)
≤ 2nR · (n+ 1)|U|·|Xˆ |·|X |·|Y|
· max
π
UXˆXY
∈Pnµ
2−nD(πUXˆXY ‖PUPXˆ|XQXY ) (80)
= (n+ 1)|U|·|Xˆ |·|X |·|Y| · 2−nθ˜µ , (81)
where
θ˜µ , min
π
UXˆXY
∈Pnµ
D(πUXˆXY ‖PUPXˆ|XQXY )−R, (82)
and (80) follows from the upper bound of Sanov’s theorem [28,
Theorem 11.4.1]. Hence,
θ˜µ = min
πUXˆXY ∈P
n
µ
D(πUXˆXY ‖PUPXˆ|XQXY )−R (83)
= min
πUXˆXY ∈P
n
µ
D(πUXˆXY ‖PUPXˆ|XQXY )
− I(U ; Xˆ)− µ (84)
= min
πUXˆXY ∈P
n
µ
D(πUXˆXY ‖PU|XˆPXˆ|XQXY ) + δ(µ), (85)
where δ(µ)→ 0 as µ→ 0. Equality (84) follows from the rate
constraint in (15) and (85) holds because |πUXˆ−PUXˆ | < µ/2.
Privacy Analysis: We analyze the privacy when H = 0.
A similar analysis holds for H = 1. Notice that Xˆn is
not necessarily i.i.d. because according to the scheme in
Section III-B, Xˆn is forced to be an all-zero sequence if the
observer decides that Xn is not typical. However, conditioned
on the event that Xn ∈ T nµ (PX), the sequence Xˆn is i.i.d.
according to the conditional pmf PXˆ|X . The privacy measure
Tn satisfies
nTn = I(X
n; Xˆn) (86)
= H(Xˆn)−H(Xˆn|Xn). (87)
In the sequel, we provide a lower bound on H(Xˆn|Xn).
H(Xˆn|Xn) =
∑
xn∈Xn
PnX(x
n)H(Xˆn|Xn = xn) (88)
≥
∑
xn∈T nµ (PX )
PnX(x
n)H(Xˆn|Xn = xn) (89)
For any xn ∈ T nµ (PX) and for µ′ > µ, it holds that
H(Xˆn|Xn = xn)
= −
∑
xˆn∈Xˆn
Pn
Xˆ|X
(xˆn|xn) logPn
Xˆ|X
(xˆn|xn) (90)
≥ −
∑
xˆn∈T n
µ′
(PXˆ|X (·|x
n))
Pn
Xˆ|X
(xˆn|xn) logPn
Xˆ|X
(xˆn|xn) (91)
≥ −
∑
xˆn∈T n
µ′
(PXˆ|X (·|x
n))
Pn
Xˆ|X
(xˆn|xn)
× log [2−n(1−µ′)H(Xˆ|X)] (92)
≥ n(1− µ′)2H(Xˆ |X) (93)
where (92) is true because for any xˆn ∈ T nµ′(PXˆ|X(·|xn)),
it holds that Pn
Xˆ|X
(xˆn|xn) ≤ 2−n(1−µ′)H(Xˆ|X), and (93)
follows because the conditional typicality lemma [26, Chap-
ter 2] implies that Pn
Xˆ|X
(T nµ′(PXˆ|X(·|xn)|xn) ≥ 1− µ′ for n
sufficiently large.
Combining (89) and (93), we obtain
H(Xˆn|Xn) ≥ n(1− µ′)2H(Xˆ |X)
∑
xn∈T nµ (PX)
PnX(x
n) (94)
≥ n(1− µ′)2(1− µ)H(Xˆ |X), (95)
where (95) follows because the AEP [28, Theorem 3.1.1]
implies that PnX(T nµ (PX)) ≥ 1− µ for n sufficiently large.
Hence, we have
I(Xn; Xˆn) = H(Xˆn)−H(Xˆn|Xn) (96)
≤ nH(Xˆ)−H(Xˆn|Xn) (97)
≤ nH(Xˆ)− n(1− µ′′)H(Xˆ |X) (98)
= nI(X ; Xˆ) + nµ′′H(Xˆ |X) (99)
≤ nL+ nµ′′H(Xˆ |X) (100)
≤ nL+ nµ′′ · log |Xˆ | (101)
= nL+ nζ, (102)
where µ′′ , 1− (1− µ′)2(1− µ) ≥ 0, and ζ , µ′′ · log |Xˆ |.
Letting n → ∞ and then letting µ, µ′ → 0, we obtain
θ˜µ → θ and lim supn→n Tn ≤ L, with θ given by the RHS
of (11). This establishes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Achievability: The analysis is based on the scheme of
Section IV-B. It follows similar steps as in [1]. Recall the
definition of the event E in (69). Consider the type-I error
probability as follows:
αn ≤ Pr
[
M = 0 or E∣∣H = 0] (103)
≤ Pr [M = 0∣∣H = 0]+ Pr [E∣∣M 6= 0,H = 0] (104)
≤ ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 (105)
= ǫ, (106)
where (106) follows from covering lemma [26, Lemma 3.3]
and the rate constraint in (15), and also the Markov lemma [26,
Lemma 12.1]. Now, consider the type-II error probability as
follows:
βn = Pr[Hˆ = 0|H = 1] (107)
= Pr[Hˆ = 0,M 6= 0|H = 1] (108)
≤ Pr[Hˆ = 0|H = 1,M 6= 0] (109)
= Pr[Hˆ = 0|H = 1,M = 1], (110)
9where the last equality follows from the symmetry of the code
construction. Now, the average of type-II error probability over
all codebooks satisfies:
EC [βn] ≤ 2−n[I(U ;Y )−δ(µ)], (111)
where δ(µ) is a function that tends to zero as µ→ 0. The pri-
vacy analysis is straightforward since the privacy mechanism
is memoryless whence we have
1
n
I(Xn; Xˆn) = I(X ; Xˆ) = L+ ζ, (112)
where the last equality follows from the privacy constraint in
(15). This concludes the proof of achievability.
Converse: Now, we prove the strong converse. It involves an
extension of the η-image characterization technique [4], [30].
For a given PXY define V
n(yn|xn) , PnY |X(yn|xn) for all
xn ∈ Xn and yn ∈ Yn. A set B ⊆ Yn is an η-image of the
set A ⊆ Xn over the channel V n if
V n (B|xn) ≥ η, ∀xn ∈ A. (113)
Let B(A, η) denote the collection of all η-images of A and
define
κV n(A,QXY , η) ,
minB∈B(A,η)Q
n
XY (A×B)
PnX(A)
. (114)
This quantity is a generalization of the minimum cardinality
of the η-images in [30] and is closely related to the minimum
type-II error probability associated with the set A.
For the testing against independence setup,QXY = PX ·PY ,
and thus
QnXY (A×B)
PnX(A)
=
PnX(A)P
n
Y (B)
PnX(A)
= PnY (B), (115)
and κV n(A,QXY , η) is simply written as κV n(A, η) and is
given by
κV n(A, η) , min
B∈B(A,η)
PnY (B). (116)
The proof of the upper bound on the error exponent in
Theorem 2 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 3 in [4]): For any set A ⊆ Xn, consider a
distribution P
(n)
A over A and let P
(n)
A V
n be its corresponding
output distribution induced by the channel V n, i.e.,
P
(n)
A V
n(yn) ,
∑
xn∈A
P
(n)
A (x
n)V n (yn|xn) . (117)
Then, for every δ′ > 0, 0 < η < 1, we have
κV n(A, η) ≥ 2−D(P
(n)
A
V n‖PnY )−nδ
′
(118)
for sufficiently large n.
For any encoding function φ(n) and any memoryless privacy
mechanism Pn
Xˆ|X
inducing an acceptance region An ⊆ Xˆn×
Xn×Yn, let τn denote the cardinality of codebook and define
the following sets:
Ci
∆
=
{
xˆn ∈ Xˆn : φ(n)(xˆn) = i
}
, (119)
Di
∆
=
{
yn ∈ Yn : g(n)(yn, i) = 0
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ τn. (120)
The acceptance region can be written as follows:
An =
τn⋃
i=1
(Ci ×Xn ×Di) , (121)
where Ci ∩ Cj = φ for all i 6= j. Define the set Bn(η) as
follows:
Bn(η) ,
{
(xˆn, xn) : V n
(
Dφ(n)(xˆn)|xn
) ≥ η}. (122)
Let Bxn(η) be the projection of the above set onto Xn, i.e.,
Bxn(η) ,
{
xn : V n
(
Dφ(n)(xˆn)|xn
) ≥ η for some xˆn} (123)
Fix ǫ ∈ [0, 1) and assume that the type-I error probability is
upper-bounded as
αn = P
n
XˆXY
(Acn) ≤ ǫ, (124)
which we can write equivalently as
1− ǫ ≤ Pn
XˆXY
(An) (125)
=
∑
(xˆn,xn)∈Bn(η)
Pn
XˆX
(xˆn, xn)V n
(
Dφ(n)(xˆn)|xn
)
+
∑
(xˆn,xn)∈Bcn(η)
Pn
XˆX
(xˆn, xn)V n
(
Dφ(n)(xˆn)|xn
)
(126)
≤ Pn
XˆX
(Bn(η)) + η
(
1− Pn
XˆX
(Bn(η))
)
, (127)
where the first term is because V n
(
Dφ(n)(xˆn)|xn
) ≤ 1; and
the second term is because for any (xˆn, xn) ∈ Bcn(η), we have
V n
(
Dφ(n)(xˆn)|xn
)
< η.
In what follows, let η = 1−ǫ2 . Inequality (127) implies
Pn
XˆX
(Bn(η)) ≥ 1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
. (128)
Let µn = n
−1/3. For the typical set T nµn(PXˆX), we have
Pn
XˆX
(T nµn(PXˆX)) ≥ 1− |X | · |Xˆ |4µ2nn . (129)
Hence,
Pn
XˆX
(T nµn(PXˆX) ∩ Bn(η))
≥ Pn
XˆX
(T nµn(PXˆX))+ PnXˆX (Bn(η))− 1 (130)
≥ 1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
− |X | · |Xˆ |
4µ2nn
. (131)
For any 0 < δ < 1−ǫ1+ǫ and for sufficiently large n,
Pn
XˆX
(T nµn(PXˆX) ∩ Bn(η)) ≥ δ. (132)
We can also write T nµn(PXˆX) as
T nµn(PXˆX) =
⋃
PˆXˆX :|PˆXˆX−PXˆX |≤µn
T n(PˆXˆX). (133)
Combining the above equations, we get∑
PˆXˆX :|PˆXˆX−PXˆX |≤µn
Pn
XˆX
(
T n(PˆXˆX) ∩ Bn(η)
)
≥ δ. (134)
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Let P˜XˆX denote the type which maximizes the P
n
XˆX
-
probability of the type class among all such types. As there
exist at most (n+ 1)|Xˆ |·|X | possible types, it holds that
Pn
XˆX
(T n(P˜XˆX) ∩ Bn(η)) ≥ δ
(n+ 1)|Xˆ |·|X |
. (135)
Notice that the above inequality implies the following:
PnX
(T n(P˜X) ∩ Bxn(η)) ≥ δ
(n+ 1)|Xˆ |·|X |
, (136)
because Pr(A) ≥ Pr(A ∩ B). Define the sets Ψn(η) ,
T n(P˜XˆX) ∩ Bn(η) and Ψxn(η) , T n(P˜X) ∩ Bxn(η). We can
write the probability in (135) as
Pn
XˆX
(T n(P˜XˆX) ∩ Bn(η))
=
∑
(xˆn,xn)∈Ψn(η)
Pn
XˆX
(xˆn, xn) (137)
=
∑
(xˆn,xn)∈Ψn(η)
2
−n
[
D(P˜XˆX‖PXˆX )+HP˜
XˆX
(Xˆ,X)
]
(138)
≤
∑
(xˆn,xn)∈Ψn(η)
2−n[H(Xˆ,X)−δ1] (139)
where δ1 → 0 as n → ∞ due to the fact that
D(P˜XˆX‖PXˆX) ≥ 0 and |P˜XˆX −PXˆX | ≤ µn so the entropies
are also arbitrarily close. It then follows from (135) and (139)
that
1
n
log |Ψn(η)| ≥ H(Xˆ,X)− δ2, (140)
where δ2 → 0 as µn → 0. Similarly, we can show that
1
n
log |Ψxn(η)| ≥ H(X)− δ3, (141)
where δ3 → 0 as µn → 0.
The encoding function φ(n) partitions the set Ψn(η) into τn
non-intersecting subsets {Si}τni=1 such that φ(n)(f (n)(xn)) = i
for any xn ∈ Si. Define the following distribution:
P ˆ
¯
Xn
¯
Xn(xˆ
n, xn) ,
Pn
XˆX
(xˆn, xn) · 1{(xˆn, xn) ∈ Ψn(η)}
Pn
XˆX
(Ψn(η))
.
(142)
Note that this distribution, denoted by P
(n)
γ , corresponds to
a uniform distribution over the set Ψn(η) because all the
sequences in Ψn(η) have the same type P˜XˆX , and as the
probability is uniform on a type class under any i.i.d. measure.
Hence, the resulting marginals P
¯
Xˆn and P¯
Xn are also uniform.
Let
¯
M , φ(n)(
¯
Xˆn) and
¯
Y n be connected with
¯
Xn by the
channel V n = PnY |X . Also, let P
(n)
i V
n be the distribution of
the random variable
¯
Y n given
¯
M = i.
The type-II error probability can be lower-bounded as:
βn ≥
∑
(xˆn,xn)∈Ψn(η)
Pn
XˆX
(xˆn, xn) · PnY
(
Dφ(n)(xˆn)
)
(143)
=
τn∑
i=1
Pn
XˆX
(Si) · PnY (Di) (144)
≥
τn∑
i=1
Pn
XˆX
(Si) · κV n(Si, η) (145)
= Pn
XˆX
(Ψn(η)) ·
τn∑
i=1
P (n)γ (Si) · κV n(Si, η) (146)
≥ 2−nδ′ · Pn
XˆX
(Ψn(η))
·
τn∑
i=1
P (n)γ (Si) · 2−D
(
P
(n)
i V
n
∥∥PnY ) (147)
≥ 2−nδ′ · Pn
XˆX
(Ψn(η))
· 2−
∑τn
i=1 P
(n)
γ (Si)·D
(
P
(n)
i V
n
∥∥PnY ) (148)
≥ 2
−nδ′δ
(n+ 1)|Xˆ |·|X |
· 2−
∑τn
i=1 P
(n)
γ (Si)·D
(
P
(n)
i V
n
∥∥PnY ), (149)
where (145) follows from the definition of κV n(Si, η), (147)
follows because Lemma 1 implies that for any distribu-
tion P
(n)
i over the set Si it holds that κV n(Si, η) ≥
2
−D
(
P
(n)
i V
n‖PnY
)
−nδ′
, (148) follows because of the convexity
of the function t 7→ 2t, and (149) follows by (135) and the
fact that Pr(A) ≥ Pr(A ∩B). Hence,
− 1
n
log βn − δ′′ ≤ 1
n
τn∑
i=1
P (n)γ (Si) ·D
(
P
(n)
i V
n‖PnY
)
, (150)
where δ′′ , δ′ − 1n log δ(n+1)|Xˆ|·|X| .
Considering the fact that P
(n)
γ (Si) = P
¯
M (i), the right-hand-
side of (150) can be upper-bounded as follows:
1
n
τn∑
i=1
P (n)γ (Si) ·D(P (n)i V n‖PnY )
=
1
n
τn∑
i=1
∑
yn∈Yn
P
¯
M
¯
Y n(i, y
n) log
P
¯
Y n|
¯
M (y
n|i)
PnY (y
n)
(151)
= − 1
n
H(
¯
Y n|
¯
M)− 1
n
∑
yn∈Yn
P
¯
Y n(y
n) logPnY (y
n) (152)
= − 1
n
H(
¯
Y n|
¯
M)− 1
n
∑
yn∈Yn
P
¯
Y n(y
n)
n∑
t=1
logPY (yt)
(153)
= − 1
n
H(
¯
Y n|
¯
M)− 1
n
n∑
t=1
∑
yn∈Yn
P
¯
Y n(y
n) logPY (yt)
(154)
= − 1
n
H(
¯
Y n|
¯
M)− 1
n
n∑
t=1
∑
yt∈Y
P
¯
Yt(yt) logPY (yt) (155)
= − 1
n
H(
¯
Y n|
¯
M) +
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
H(
¯
Yt) +D(P
¯
Yt‖PY )
]
(156)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
H(
¯
Yt)−H(
¯
Yt|
¯
M,
¯
Y t−1) +D(P
¯
Yt‖PY )
]
(157)
≤ 1
n
n∑
t=1
I(
¯
M,
¯
Xt−1, ˆ
¯
Xt−1;
¯
Yt) +
1
n
n∑
t=1
D(P
¯
Yt‖PY ) (158)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
I(
¯
Ut;
¯
Yt) +
1
n
n∑
t=1
D(P
¯
Yt‖PY ) (159)
= I(
¯
U ;
¯
Y ) +D(P
¯
Y ‖PY ). (160)
Here, (157)–(160) are justified in the following:
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• (157) follows by the chain rule;
• (158) follows from the Markov chain
¯
Y t−1⊸−(
¯
M,
¯
Xt−1, ˆ
¯
Xt−1)⊸−¯Yt;
• (159) follows from the definition
¯
Ut , (
¯
M,
¯
Xt−1, ˆ
¯
Xt−1); (161)
• (160) follows by defining a time-sharing random variable
T over {1, . . . , n} and the following
¯
U
∆
= (
¯
UT , T ),
¯
Y
∆
=
¯
YT . (162)
This leads to the following upper-bound on the type-II error
exponent:
− 1
n
log βn ≤ I(
¯
U ;
¯
Y ) +D(P
¯
Y ‖PY ) + δ′′. (163)
Next, the rate constraint satisfies the following:
nR ≥ H(
¯
M) (164)
≥ I(
¯
M ;
¯
Xn, ˆ
¯
Xn) (165)
= H(
¯
Xn, ˆ
¯
Xn)−H(
¯
Xn, ˆ
¯
Xn|
¯
M) (166)
= log
∣∣Ψn(η)∣∣ −H(
¯
Xn, ˆ
¯
Xn|
¯
M) (167)
≥ n(H(Xˆ,X)− δ2)−H(
¯
Xn, ˆ
¯
Xn|
¯
M) (168)
= nH(Xˆ,X)−
n∑
t=1
H(
¯
Xt, ˆ
¯
Xt|¯X
t−1, ˆ
¯
Xt−1,
¯
M)
− nδ2 (169)
= nH(Xˆ,X)−
n∑
t=1
H(
¯
Xt, ˆ
¯
Xt|¯Ut)− nδ2 (170)
= nH(Xˆ,X)− nH(
¯
X, ˆ
¯
X|
¯
U)− nδ2 (171)
where (167) follows because the distribution P ˆ
¯
Xn
¯
Xn is uni-
form over the set Ψn(η); (168) follows from (140); (170)
follows from the definition in (161); (171) follows by defining
¯
X ,
¯
XT and ˆ
¯
X , ˆ
¯
XT .
Finally, the privacy measure satisfies the following:
nL ≥ I(
¯
Xn; ˆ
¯
Xn) (172)
= H(
¯
Xn)−H(
¯
Xn| ˆ
¯
Xn) (173)
= log
∣∣Ψxn(η)∣∣−H(¯Xn| ˆ¯Xn) (174)
≥ (H(X)− δ3)−H(
¯
Xn| ˆ
¯
Xn) (175)
= n(H(X)− δ3)−
n∑
t=1
H(
¯
Xt|
¯
Xt−1, ˆ
¯
Xn) (176)
≥ n(H(X)− δ3)−
n∑
t=1
H(
¯
Xt| ˆ
¯
Xt) (177)
= nH(X)− nH(
¯
X | ˆ
¯
X)− nδ3, (178)
where (175) follows from (141) and (178) follows by the usual
time-sharing arguments.
Since Ψn(η) ⊆ T n(P˜XˆX), for any x ∈ X and xˆ ∈ Xˆ ,
P ˆ
¯
X
¯
X(xˆ, x) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
P ˆ
¯
X
t ¯
Xt
(xˆ, x) (179)
=
∑
(xˆn,xn)∈Ψn(η)
N (xˆ, x|xˆn, xn)
n · |Ψn(η)| (180)
= P˜XˆX(xˆ, x). (181)
Recall that |P˜XˆX − PXˆX | ≤ µn with µn = n−1/3. Hence,
from (181), it holds that |P ˆ
¯
X
¯
X − PXˆX | ≤ µn. By the defini-
tions of
¯
Xˆ ,
¯
X and
¯
Y , we can suppose PY |X = P
¯
Y |
¯
X = V .
The random variable U is chosen over the same alphabet as
¯
U and such that PU|Xˆ = P
¯
U|
¯
Xˆ .
Since PY (y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y , letting n →∞ and µn →
0 and the uniform continuity of the involved information-
theoretic quantities yields the following upper bound on the
optimal error exponent:
θ∗ǫ (R,L) ≤ I(U ;Y ), (182)
subject to the rate constraint:
R ≥ I(U ; Xˆ,X) ≥ I(U ; Xˆ), (183)
and the privacy constraint:
L ≥ I(X ; Xˆ). (184)
This concludes the proof of converse.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE OF PROPOSITION 1
We simplify Theorem 2 for the proposed binary setup. As
discussed in Section IV-C, from the fact that |Xˆ | = 2 and the
symmetry of the source X on its alphabet, without loss of
optimality, we can choose PXˆ|X to be a BSC. First, consider
the rate constraint:
R ≥ I(U ; Xˆ) (185)
= H(Xˆ)−H(Xˆ |U) (186)
= 1−H(Xˆ |U), (187)
which can be equivalently written as the following:
H(Xˆ |U) ≥ 1−R. (188)
Also, the privacy criterion can be simplified as follows:
L ≥ I(Xˆ ;X) (189)
= H(Xˆ)−H(Xˆ |X) (190)
= 1−H(Xˆ |X) (191)
= 1−H(Zˆ), (192)
which can be equivalently written as
H(Zˆ) ≥ 1− L. (193)
Now, consider the error exponent θ as follows:
θ ≤ I(U ;Y ) (194)
= H(Y )−H(Y |U) (195)
= H(Y )−H(X ⊕N |U) (196)
= H(Y )−H(Xˆ ⊕ Zˆ ⊕N |U) (197)
≤ H(Y )− hb
(
h−1b (H(Xˆ |U)) ⋆ h−1b (1− L) ⋆ q
)
(198)
≤ H(Y )− hb
(
h−1b (1−R) ⋆ h−1b (1 − L) ⋆ q
)
, (199)
where (198) follows from Mrs. Gerber’s lemma [31, Theo-
rem 1] and the fact that (Zˆ, N) is independent of U and also
from (193); (199) follows from (188). This concludes the proof
of the proposition.
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APPENDIX D
EUCLIDEAN APPROXIMATION OF TESTING AGIANST
INDEPENDENCE
We analyze the Euclidean approximation with the pa-
rameters defined in Section IV-D. Notice that since
U⊸−Xˆ⊸−X⊸−Y forms a Markov chain, it holds that, for
any u ∈ U ,
PY |U=u =WPX|U=u. (200)
Now, consider the following chain of equalities for any x ∈ X :
PX|U (x|u)
=
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
PXXˆ|U (x, xˆ|u) (201)
=
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
PXˆ|U (xˆ|u) PX|Xˆ,U (x|xˆ, u) (202)
=
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
PXˆ|U (xˆ|u) PX|Xˆ(x|xˆ) (203)
=
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
(
PXˆ(xˆ) + ψu(xˆ)
)
(PX(x) + φxˆ(x)) (204)
= PX(x) +
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
ψu(xˆ) φxˆ(x)
+
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
PXˆ(xˆ) φxˆ(x) + PX(x)
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
ψu(xˆ) (205)
= PX(x) +
∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
ψu(xˆ) φxˆ(x), (206)
where (203)—(206) are justified in the following:
• (203) follows from the Markov chain U⊸−Xˆ⊸−X
where given Xˆ , U and X are independent;
• (204) follows from (30) and (36);
• (206) follows from (31) and also from (36) which yields
the following: ∑
xˆ∈Xˆ
PXˆ(xˆ) · φxˆ(x) = 0. (207)
With the definition of Λu(x) in (42), we can write
PX|U (x|u) = PX(x) + Λu(x), ∀x ∈ X , u ∈ U . (208)
Thus, we get
PY |U=u =WPX +WΛu (209)
= PY +WΛu. (210)
Applying the χ2-approximation and using (210), we can
rewrite I(U ;Y ) as follows:
I(U ;Y ) ≈ 1
2
log e
∑
u∈U
PU (u)
∥∥∥∥[√PY ]−1WΛu
∥∥∥∥
2
(211)
The above approximation with the definition of the vector Λu
in (43) yields the optimization problem in (45).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Achievability: We specialize the achievable scheme of Theo-
rem 2 to the proposed Gaussian setup. We choose the auxiliary
random variables as in (63) and (65). Notice that from the
Markov chain U⊸−Xˆ⊸−X⊸−Y and also the Gaussian
choice of Xˆ in (63) which was discussed in Section IV-E, we
can write Y = ρXˆ+F where F ∼ N (0, 1− ρ2 · (1− 2−2L))
is independent of Xˆ . These choices of auxiliary random
variables lead to the following rate constraint:
R ≥ 1
2
log
(
1− 2−2L
β2
)
, (212)
which can be equivalently written as:
2−2R · (1− 2−2L) ≤ β2. (213)
The optimal error exponent is also lower bounded as follows
θ∗ǫ (R,L) ≥
1
2
log
(
1
1− ρ2 · (1− 2−2L − β2)
)
. (214)
Combining (213) and (214) gives the lower bound on the error
exponent in (64).
Converse: Consider the following upper bound on the opti-
mal error exponent in Theorem 2:
θ∗ǫ (R,L)
≤ I(U ;Y ) (215)
= h(Y )− h(Y |U) (216)
=
1
2
log (2πe)− h(Y |U) (217)
=
1
2
log (2πe)− h(ρXˆ + F ∣∣U) (218)
≤ 1
2
log (2πe)− 1
2
log
(
22h(ρXˆ|U)
+ 2πe
(
1− ρ2 · (1 − 2−2L)) ) (219)
≤ 1
2
log (2πe)− 1
2
log
(
ρ2 22h(Xˆ|U)
+ 2πe
(
1− ρ2 · (1 − 2−2L)) ), (220)
where (219) follows from the entropy power inequality
(EPI) [26, Chapter 2]. Now, consider the rate constraint as
follows:
R ≥ I(Xˆ ;U) (221)
= h(Xˆ)− h(Xˆ |U) (222)
=
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
1− 2−2L))− h(Xˆ |U), (223)
which is equivalent to
22h(Xˆ|U) ≥ 2πe · 2−2R · (1− 2−2L) . (224)
Considering (220) with (224) yields the following upper bound
on the error exponent:
θ∗ǫ (R,L) ≤
1
2
log (2πe)− 1
2
log
(
2πeρ22−2R
(
1− 2−2L)
+ 2πe
(
1− ρ2 (1− 2−2L)) ) (225)
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=
1
2
log
(
1
1− ρ2 (1 − 2−2R) (1− 2−2L)
)
. (226)
This concludes the proof of the proposition.
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